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Local and regional economic development efforts consisting of 
public subsidies for business and public support for promoting 
increased local consumption are based on the “market failure” 
approach. Such activities are attempts to correct the operation of 
nonfunctioning private markets. This approach, while still widely 
touted and utilized, also presents questions as to its effectiveness, 
especially in Rust Belt cities.
From the time of the Industrial Revolution through the middle of 
the twentieth century, the enormous capital investments made in cit-
ies such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, St. 
Louis, and Detroit helped the industries within them to become pre-
eminently competitive.1 High levels of immigration, to supply their 
demands for largely blue-collar labor, were another contributing factor. 
As a result, these and similar cities became globally dominant indus-
trial powerhouses. Fabulous wealth was created. But as the end of the 
twentieth century unfolded, knowledge and technology advanced, and 
the world economy changed. 
Today these same places have earned reputations as lackluster, Rust 
Belt cities with serious problems. Large numbers of talented people 
have, for the past several decades, steadily out-migrated from them 
for better opportunities elsewhere, leaving behind obsolete produc-
tion facilities built for early to mid twentieth century manufacturing, 
a public infrastructure in poor condition, relatively high taxes, and a 
strongly unionized workforce.2 The large and now deteriorating invest-
ments in capital and infrastructure have become increasingly diffi cult to 
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maintain with continuously declining populations and correspondingly 
smaller tax bases. Population loss has also brought reduced capacity 
for local and county government agencies to provide public services, as 
well as lessened representation in national-level political decision pro-
cesses. Figure 10.1 shows the population decline over recent decades.
The public and to some degree nonprofi t sectors in these cities 
have responded to the deterioration in part by enacting a range of local 
economic-development initiatives. These include public or quasi-public 
interventions into local markets through various forms of incentives and 
subsidies designed to change the respective city’s local economic growth 
paths. They include industrial parks, tax abatements, enterprise zones, 
aquariums, artist incubators, river walks, casinos, festival marketplaces, 
and many others. There are many examples of these initiatives.
In Cuyahoga County, Ohio (home of Cleveland), for instance, the 
three county commissioners decided in 2007 to expend well in excess 
of $465 million of taxpayer money for a privately owned and operated 
“Medical Mart” (Nichols 2009). The decision was ostensibly predicated 
on the promise of a one-stop shop in which major medical vendors, 
such as GE, Phillips, and Siemens, would have fl oor space upon which 
to sell medical products to hospitals and doctors from around the world 
visiting Cleveland and looking to buy the latest in medical technology 
and cutting-edge equipment. A powerful local coalition of advocates 
alleged that this would attract a steady stream of conferences and con-
ventions, bringing hundreds of thousands of physicians and hospital 
administrators to the city each year, creating a huge number of new 
jobs, generating major new local revenues, and otherwise revitalizing 
the region. 
Insofar as public deliberation occurred at all, it was not widespread 
or robust. It did not include anything vaguely resembling judicious 
consideration of the expected value of returns to the public coffers 
from the expenditure, much less of the research showing that munici-
pal outlays for purposes of attracting conventions in the past have not 
always yielded positive results for local economies (Fenich 1992; 
Hovinen 2002; Isler 2008; Laslo and Judd 2004; Noll and Zimbalist 
1997; Sanders 2004, 2005). To support the mart, the county commis-
sioners, in closed meetings purportedly held to protect the owner opera-
tor’s trade secrets, without a vote of the county’s citizens, and without 
a publicly available cost-benefi t analysis, decided to fund the Medi-
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cal Mart from a 20-year $0.0025 sales tax on every dollar spent in the 
county. 
Similarly, throughout the industrial Midwest and beyond, elected 
and other urban authorities have supported and committed public funds 
to construct and operate major sports-related and other facilities that 
would supposedly raise the respective city’s growth paths. Examples 
include stadiums, arenas, and training centers in Buffalo, Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Virtually all 
were designed and built using public funds, but privately owned and 
operated, ostensibly to stem decline and renew prosperity by creating 
jobs (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). The costs of constructing and running 
these facilities have been funded primarily through broad-based general 
taxes.3 Specifi c illustrations of initiatives justifi ed by local economic 
development objectives include the America’s Center Convention Com-
plex in St. Louis, the Detroit Creative Business Accelerator, the Detroit 
Economic Growth Corporation for Business Retention and Attraction, 
the Team Northeast Ohio (NEO) Minority Business Attraction Initiative 
Figure 10.1  Changing Population in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1990–2010
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in Cleveland, the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center and 
the Queensgate Terminals in Cincinnati, the Forest Hills Community 
Development Corporation in Pittsburgh, and the Niagara Convention 
Center in Buffalo, among many others. 
Use of local economic development initiatives characteristically 
involves the exercise of public authority and the taxing power to claim 
some portion of the total local resource base for declared purposes of 
economic and job growth. The policies are supposed to affect consumer 
or fi rm behavior, or both. Generally, they involve tax abatements or 
public expenditures for the stated goals of providing public benefi ts 
within the urban or regional economic system.4 They comprise a range 
of public subsidies and direct cash aid for businesses, such as fi nan-
cial incentives for branch plant recruitment, capital market programs, 
information and education, export assistance, and centers for business-
related research. The approaches include property and income taxes 
that are reduced or credited to selected private interests. They also con-
sist of public fi nancial support for purposes of increasing levels of local 
consumption spending on items such as publicly fi nanced tourism and 
art facilities, casinos, and outdoor recreation activities. All constitute 
one form or another of a “nonmarket allocation mechanism” (Arrow 
1985). 
In the following pages we focus specifi cally on the market fail-
ure rationale for these and similar local economic development initia-
tives (Bartik 1990). In this line of reasoning, economic development 
initiatives are justifi ed in terms of standard neoclassical microeconom-
ics by the effort to restore economic effi ciency. The rationale for them 
assumes that they will have the effect of correcting impediments to the 
formation or operation of private markets. Such obstacles are widely 
considered to include external costs and benefi ts, imperfect informa-
tion and the existence of various monopolies, such as public utilities. 
On Bartik’s (1990) account, they also consist of involuntary unemploy-
ment and underemployment, imperfect capital markets attributable to 
suboptimal regulation, distorted fi scal benefi ts, improperly set social 
discount rates, underinvestment in human capital, imperfections in 
knowledge and information markets, and spillovers from research and 
development activities. Each of these forms of market failure has its 
own corresponding means of policy evaluation. The presence of any 
of them within a regional market could justify the use of an economic 
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development initiative. Several forms of market failure may also occur 
simultaneously, in circumstances of multiple market failure. 
We fi rst consider some reasons to have reservations with this 
approach, specifi cally based on principles espoused by members of the 
Austrian school of economics (Hayek 1944; Ikeda 2004; O’Toole 2004; 
Sautet 2004). As the following pages describe, Austrian economic the-
ory stipulates that competition in free markets is virtually the only real 
way to create local prosperity. Then we consider further reasons for such 
reservations based on the theory of the second best (Wolf 1979). The 
theory of the second best stipulates that, under conditions of multiple 
market failure, the outcomes of economic development initiatives are 
inherently unpredictable. Finally, we assess the implications of these 
considerations for the use of local economic development initiatives to 
renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities today. 
AUSTRIAN CRITIQUES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
The Austrian critiques of local economic development initiatives 
differ markedly from popular knee-jerk misgivings about the growth in 
public spending and taxation that have occurred over the past decades 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000). This is not to say that these popular con-
cerns have no basis in fact. The growth in public spending and taxation 
is real, but the Austrian misgivings are in no way knee-jerk. One way 
to look at the trends within Rust Belt cities is in terms of change in per-
capita locally generated general revenue.5 Figures 10.2 and 10.3 illus-
trate these trends for the fi nal decades of the twentieth century vis-a-
vis selected cities from this group. Figure 10.2 indicates that per-capita
locally generated general revenues incrementally have increased for time 
period 1977–2002. Figure 10.3 shows similar trends on a constant 
income basis, adjusted for the cost of living.6 It may be noted that while 
Detroit is out of sync with the trends in the other cities, it is the only one 
that has recently gone bankrupt. 
The Austrian critiques also differ from scholarly misgivings about 
local economic development initiatives that stem from the mixed and 
largely inconclusive results of analysis from the applied social science 
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research community. Some of this social science research shows that 
local economic development initiatives have had at least some short-
term positive effects (Bartik 1991; Reese and Ye 2011). Other studies 
fi nd that economic development initiatives have either not induced the 
promised improvements, did not have any discernible effects at all, or 
led to less economic prosperity (Hissong 2003; Ikeda and Staley 2004; 
Peters and Fisher 2003, 2004; Reese and Ye 2011; Swetkis 2009). 
Figure 10.2  Locally Generated General General Revenue per Capita in 
Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002
NOTE: Tax revenues are shown in 2002 dollars, which are adjusted at a constantly 
infl ated rate of base year 2002. Data for all cities are based on county-level informa-
tion for the county containing the central city. A linear regression through these data 
fi t well and have positive slopes. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($290.09, 0.7612), 
($215.19, 0.6771), ($244.23, 0.7116), ($174.69, 0.6378), ($23.53, 0.0219), ($105.03, 
0.4520), and ($156.33, 0.6015) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, 
Milwaukee, and St. Louis, respectively.
SOURCE: Population numbers are from the U.S. Census Bureau for 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997, and 2002; locally generated general tax revenues are from Annual Survey 
of Governments of the U.S. Census Bureau, which are produced by Inter-university 
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Figure 10.3  Locally Generated General Revenue per Thousand Dollars 
of Personal Income in Selected Rust Belt Cities, 1977–2002
NOTE: General revenues and personal income are all adjusted to constant 2002 dol-
lars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). All cities are based on county-level data 
for the county containing the central city. Locally generated general revenues per 
$1,000 of personal income represent the fi nancial burden of county residents to pay 
taxes. Though the regression lines in Figure 10.3 do not all fi t as well as do the lines 
in Figure 10.2, with the exception of Detroit the slopes on the regression lines for all 
of the cities remain positive. The slopes and R2 statistics are ($5.10, 0.4835), ($0.96, 
0.0398), ($3.13, 0.2303), ($2.30, 0.1895), (−$1.62, 0.0453), ($0.84, 0.0254), and 
($0.59, 0.0246) for Cleveland, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee, 
and St. Louis, respectively.
SOURCE: Locally generated general revenues are from the Annual Survey of Govern-
ments of the U.S. Census Bureau produced by ICPSR, which is available at http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu); personal income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 
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The Austrian critiques instead are based conceptually in disputes 
over the realism of the assumptions made in neoclassical microeconom-
ics, particularly the supposition that decision makers are rational and in 
possession of complete information (Caplan 1999). Austrian economic 
theorists specifi cally reject the realism of any assumption that market 
decision makers can ever act on the basis of anything remotely similar 
to omniscience about their situations. Instead, these theorists maintain 
that all decisions that create wealth and prosperity, or not, including 
those involving local economic development initiatives, are made by 
ordinary people. Accordingly, these people are fallible. They possess 
imperfect knowledge, and seldom if ever make fully rational choices. 
Their characteristics are those of Homo sapiens, not homo economicus. 
When in positions of authority to make public initiative decisions, they 
are at times seriously threatened by moral hazards, misaligned incen-
tives, special interest groups, and political infl uences. 
The Concept of Catallaxy
Much of the Austrian critique centers on the concept of catallaxy. 
This term describes the origin of wealth and prosperity, stipulating spe-
cifi cally that they must emanate at least in part from spontaneously aris-
ing circumstances beyond the capacity of any given fi nite set of human 
decision makers to design. The concept is rooted in Frederick Hayek’s 
philosophy of social order (Hayek 1944, 1945, 1976a,b). 
Hayek assumed the order that we as humans fi nd in the world is 
given to it at least in part by our own minds (Gray 1982). Humans, he 
thought, are active and organic, albeit “constrained” choosers of pur-
poses and means to achieve them (Sowell 1987). We make our choices 
and earn our living in the world not so much on the basis of primarily 
abstract or theoretical knowledge as on the basis of practical knowl-
edge. Hayek used “special knowledge of circumstances” to refer to the 
knowledge with which we do this. Accordingly, special knowledge of 
circumstances is the understanding of concrete situations, local con-
ditions, people, and opportunities. It has both abstract and practical 
dimensions. It is abstract in that all of it is explicitly or otherwise predi-
cated upon assumptions, some of which are explicit but most are tacit, 
for instance, about human nature, language, and reasoning, through the 
relationships among elements of sensory perceptions. At the same time, 
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such knowledge is practical in that it is embodied in habits of thought, 
perception, and behavior that allow us to act so as to survive, adapt 
to our ever-changing circumstances, and achieve our purposes.7 At its 
best, this knowledge allows us to act so as to create wealth and prosper-
ity, primarily through market exchanges. 
The Limitations of Decision Makers
Because special knowledge of circumstances is always at least in 
part attributable to the active ordering structures of our own minds, it 
is at best limited and idiographic. Social and economic reality, Hayek 
contended, is far too complex to be comprehended by a single mind. 
While any one person or group may possess enough knowledge to suc-
cessfully provide answers for the full range of questions that can be 
asked within the context of a given set of assumptions, only a limited 
range of questions may be asked from within that same set. The knowl-
edge required to make sound decisions about how to improve prosper-
ity for an entire urban economic system exists only in widely disbursed 
form among all of the members of that system, each of whom knows 
his or her own situation and purposes better than does anyone else. This 
information greatly exceeds that available to any single political author-
ity or business leader, economic development planning committee, or 
government agency. 
Accordingly, no decision maker, group of decision makers, or agency
involved with a local economic development initiative can possibly be 
suffi ciently well informed and rational to be able to calculate and co-
ordinate all the variables that contribute to the creation of wealth and 
prosperity in an urban economic system. Therefore, it is not feasible 
for them to reliably predict the full range of outcomes from any such 
initiative. When social norms nevertheless routinely accept the use of 
local economic development initiatives as substitutes for market deci-
sions, the likely effects include excessively large and unaccountable 
local governments, untrustworthy urban governance processes, waste 
of resources, retardation of the creation of wealth and the renewal of 
prosperity, and disrespect for the preferences, if not individual liberties, 
of those who are either unwilling or unable to exert political infl uence 
on the allocation decisions. 
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The Importance of the Market
The concept of catallaxy suggests that, in capitalistic markets, social 
and economic order and prosperity emerge from the chaos of myriads of 
human decisions in “the mutual adjustment of many individual econo-
mies in a market” (Hayek 1976b, pp. 108–109). Prosperity arises spon-
taneously through the coordinated interactions and mutual adjustments 
of multitudes of unfettered market exchanges, each of which occurs on 
the basis of price signals and the partial knowledge of the participants, 
not as a result of economic development initiatives. To be sure, some 
participants are more knowledgeable than others, and some are more 
resourceful. But none conduct their exchanges within the context of a 
fully integrated and orchestrated social system known as “the market,” 
especially not one that produces any sort of defi nable public interest 
or overall product that local economic development authorities might 
optimize in the manner of a linear program. The idea that the purpose 
of an urban economy is to maximize one form or another of a social 
objective function or total social product, such as the number of new 
jobs, and that local economic development decision makers can make 
reliable decisions to improve or increase it is simply a misconception. 
Following this line of reasoning, the idea that economic develop-
ment decision makers know enough to somehow maximize a social 
objective function for the whole of an urban economy, or even at the 
margin to nudge things in their intended direction, is little more than 
hubris. The limitations on their knowledge imply that they could never 
conceive, much less design and orchestrate, the array of exchange most 
conducive to prosperity within a city of any size with anywhere near the 
degree of balance and nuance as can the market. Instead, the greatest 
feasible degree of decentralized, bottom-up decision making will lead 
to the greatest increases in prosperity. To reliably design and deliver a 
mechanism for changing a midwestern industrial city’s economic path, 
authorities would have to know not only the entire range of relevant 
facts and relations, but also how all individuals would mutually accom-
modate each other as a result of its implementation. Even the very best 
theories of social planning, human behavior, and economics are not 
adequate for the requisite tasks. 
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Implications for the Role of Government
The concept of catallaxy also has implications for the institutions 
used to govern local market behavior, especially in terms of democratic 
values and individual rights. Hayek, in particular, was concerned about 
the reach of governmental power into economic affairs. He maintained 
that, when governmental power is held and exercised by those who do 
not recognize or care about the limitations of their own knowledge, or 
by those who are intent primarily on further enhancing their own power 
and authority, one of the likely effects is to unduly restrict individual 
freedoms and effectively violate the rights of others. The use of local 
economic development initiatives to change urban economic growth 
paths may thus at times confl ict with the core values of freedom, equal-
ity, and private property on which the potential renewal of prosperity 
must be judged. Anyone who has gone before a zoning commission or 
an architectural review board, or who has attempted to change the mind 
of a determined county commissioner understands and knows that local 
governments can wield sweeping and at times even seemingly tyranni-
cal powers.8 
In the case of Cleveland’s Medical Mart, by 2011, after project cost 
escalations of over $150 million, and after construction had started, 
it became evident that the concept had failed to attract large, multi-
national or national vendors who wanted to display their products. 
Instead, it was announced that the mart would house primarily local 
vendors, including hospitals, universities, and fi rms in the information 
technology, security system, and aromatherapy business (Campbell 
2011). The stated purpose also morphed from the attraction of hun-
dreds of thousands of doctors and hospital administrators from outside 
the region, looking to purchase high-tech medical devices, to a largely 
locally oriented center for continuing medical education (Campbell 
2011; Gomez 2011). Rather than housing major national medical sup-
ply fi rms, the main tenants were local and included small medical busi-
nesses, universities, and other medical interests from the area, not out-
side vendors that would attract a steady stream of medical conventions. 
In summary, the Austrian critiques argue that local economic devel-
opment initiatives are no substitute for the verdicts of unfettered capi-
talist markets. There is moreover every reason to believe that private 
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investors placing their own money at risk will make better decisions 
than will economic development authorities. Thus, if a medical mart, 
convention center, stadium, or other local initiative is predicted to gen-
erate net positive revenues for an urban economy, let private markets 
make the full investment and reap the full profi ts, or take the full losses 
it brings. Only unfettered markets can rationally coordinate the demand 
and supply of land, labor, capital, and technology so as to create wide-
spread prosperity. Had the $465 million or more tax dollars spent on the 
Cleveland Medical Mart otherwise not been taxed, and had the funds 
instead remained in free markets, those dollars would have been used 
in other ways, some of which might have generated genuine prosperity 
for a range of the region’s citizens.
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 
AND THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST
On these conceptual foundations, Austrian economic theorists argue 
that, of all feasible alternatives thus far conceived, the activity of vol-
untary exchange in unfettered capitalist markets alone has the greatest 
potential to generate widespread wealth and prosperity. This process is 
hampered by substituting the purposes and conceptions of imperfectly 
informed and cognitively limited economic development authorities for 
those of the vastly larger number of fi rms and individuals who would 
otherwise participate with the same resources in free markets. Insofar as 
such policies are rationalized by market failures attributable to imper-
fect knowledge and information, they may not be so much a solution to 
economic decline as a contributing cause of it. 
Markets fail for reasons other than imperfect information and some-
times for more than one reason at a time. Monopolies, for instance, are 
widely considered to constitute a source of market failure, as are non-
rival and nonexcludable goods and services, market transactions involv-
ing costs and benefi ts that accrue to third parties not directly involved in 
the transaction, and transactions costs that are so high that markets are 
not economically viable and therefore do not exist (Arrow 1985; Bator 
1985). Setting aside for the moment all considerations about imperfect 
knowledge, it is widely recognized that when instances of any one of 
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these other forms of market failure occur, increases in prosperity cannot 
be properly incentivized by unfettered capitalist market activity alone. 
The concept of catallaxy as a basis for a critique of local economic 
development initiatives applies only to those market failures caused 
specifi cally by imperfect knowledge and information; it has very little 
if any direct bearing upon any of these other sources of market failure. 
 Less widely acknowledged, however, is that in instances when 
more than one market failure occurs simultaneously, actions taken to 
improve some of the conditions will not necessarily improve the effi -
ciency of the urban economy as a whole. Indeed, exactly this point—
that under conditions of multiple market failure the use of any sort of 
public policy intervention will not necessarily improve the effi ciency 
of an economic system as a whole—was made formally in the general 
theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956; Wolf 1988). 
The theory of the second best stipulates that the existence of an effi -
cient market is not possible in the absence of the simultaneous fulfi ll-
ment of a set of preconditions, all of which are jointly required to ensure 
that every participant in the market is a price taker. These preconditions 
specifi cally include zero entry and exit barriers, perfect information, 
perfect factor mobility, zero transactions cost, nonincreasing returns to 
scale, and homogeneous products across suppliers (Stigler 1957). Each 
precondition is necessary, because for a market to be effi cient it must be 
impossible for any given participant to infl uence prices in the market. If 
any one of the preconditions is not fulfi lled, some market participants 
are apt to become price makers, and market failure is likely to occur. 
Moreover, if in any given market more than one of the preconditions is 
not fulfi lled, multiple market failure occurs. In turn, when the existence 
of an effi cient market is not possible, the best remaining outcome is the 
“second best.” 
The theory of the second best has the important negative corol-
lary that the public policy implications of multiple market failure are 
inherently ambiguous (Wolf 1979). That is, under conditions of mul-
tiple market failure it cannot be determined a priori exactly what the 
second-best outcome would look like or how to attain it. Moreover, a 
situation in which more, but not all, of the preconditions necessary for 
fully effi cient markets are satisfi ed is not necessarily better than one 
in which fewer are satisfi ed. The removal of any one of the constitu-
ent failures through a local economic development initiative may affect 
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overall urban economic effi ciency by raising it, lowering it, or leaving 
it unchanged. But according to the theory of the second best there is no 
theoretically sound and reliable way to tell which. The only thing cer-
tain is that the result will vary on a situation-by-situation basis. Local 
economic development initiatives under multiple market failure condi-
tions may be as likely to have a deleterious effect on the effi ciency of 
the overall urban economy as they are to have a positive one.    
This line of reasoning begs the question: do midwestern industrial 
urban economic systems contain multiple market failures? Certainly, 
pioneering urban economist Wilbur Thompson (1968) thought so, as 
have numerous subsequent urban scholars.9 As an illustration, land use 
decisions in any given urban market are apt to be subject to a combina-
tion of market failures. Some of these failures are attributable to collec-
tive action problems (Foster 2011).10 Others are due to discrimination 
in local housing markets (Herbert and Belsky 2008) and labor markets 
(Brueckner and Zenou 2003), to externalities in local housing markets 
(Dietz and Haurin 2003; Ewing 2008; Odland 1985), to capital market 
imperfections and positive external effects on the local educational sys-
tems (De Fraja 2002), to congestion on nearby roads (Arnott and Small 
1994; Downs 1962; Timilsina and Dulal 2011), to urban air pollution 
(Kahn 2006), and to high information and transactions costs in fi nancial 
systems (Levine 1997), among countless other challenges.
Both the concept of catallaxy and the theory of the second best thus 
lead to a similar general conclusion: the existence of market failure does 
not guarantee that local economic development initiatives designed and 
implemented to correct such a problem will succeed. Decisions to use 
local economic development initiatives in midwestern industrial cities 
may or may not lead to outcomes that include greater prosperity. The 
outcomes of using any given local economic development initiative 
can be assessed only approximately and ideographically on the basis of 
each individual case, and only using carefully designed and analyzed 
empirical evidence.  
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THE GOVERNMENT-FAILURE APPROACH TO LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Uncertainty and unpredictability are not only basic characteristics 
of markets but also fundamental aspects of government failure. By 
defi nition, this failure occurs in situations in which government has
“created ineffi ciencies because it should not have intervened in the fi rst 
place or when it could have solved a given problem or set of prob-
lems more effi ciently” (Winston 2006, pp. 2–3). Government failure 
has to our knowledge not been widely considered in the local economic 
development literature. With this type of failure, the goal of increased 
prosperity would have been better served by analysis and application of 
fundamental economic principles of free markets rather than by leav-
ing decisions to the tacit knowledge of circumstance possessed by local 
economic development authorities. 
Both Austrian economic theory and the theory of the second best 
lead to the inference that local economic development initiatives can-
not as a rule be counted upon to reduce waste or to stimulate wealth 
creation for average citizens. Nor can they be relied on to improve 
effi ciency in the allocation of resources beyond the level that would 
otherwise have been feasible had the resources remained circulating in 
the market. Accordingly, this provides a theoretical framework within 
which misgivings about these initiatives are rational, logical, and con-
sistent with evidence. The basic consideration is that the full range of 
outcomes is and must remain uncertain and unpredictable until well 
after the go-no-go decision is made with respect to any given local eco-
nomic development initiative. 
Intervention May Not Be the Answer
It is of signifi cance to note that in any situation in which a mar-
ket failure is shown to exist, its presence alone does not necessarily 
imply that intervention into the market can improve the situation. For 
one reason, market failures may correct themselves. For another reason, 
governments can fail, too. This could occur, for instance, in circum-
stances in which the decision to use a nonmarket allocation mechanism 
is based upon fl awed or incomplete knowledge and shortsightedness, 
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or when the relevant economic development authority, regardless of 
any conscious intentions, is subjected to the infl uences of local growth 
coalitions or other powerful special interests. 
Logically, to be consistent with the market failure approach to eco-
nomic development, decision makers deliberating a proposed initiative 
must fi rst establish that a market failure exists. But this is not enough to 
rationally justify the use of a proposed local economic development ini-
tiative. The decision makers must also ensure that all expected benefi ts 
of the proposal are at least equal to all the expected costs. 
The existence of a market failure means that properly functioning 
price signals are absent. In this situation, markets left alone will not 
yield the most effi cient use of resources, and therefore will not gen-
erate the greatest feasible levels of prosperity. Demonstration of the 
existence of a market failure is necessary for a local economic develop-
ment initiative to be rational, because in situations in which there is no 
market failure, reliance upon the unfettered market without government 
intervention is the most likely way to create new wealth or prosperity. 
At the same time, the existence of market failure is not a suffi cient con-
dition for such an initiative to be rationally justifi ed because of govern-
ment failure. Much as the absence of the preconditions for an effi cient 
market accounts for market failure, so the absence of the preconditions 
for sound public sector decision making accounts for government fail-
ure. These preconditions include knowledge and information necessary 
for economic calculation on behalf of economic development authori-
ties, appropriate incentives, adequately conceptualized decision pro-
cesses, no unanticipated behavioral responses, and no abuses of politi-
cal power.11 
If while considering a local economic development initiative deci-
sion makers fail to thoroughly consider both market failure and govern-
ment failure, they cannot possibly tell in advance of its implementation 
whether or not the costs of the initiative will or will not exceed the cor-
responding benefi ts (Bartik 1997; Peters and Fisher 2004). 
The Need for Benefi t-Cost Analysis
One of the best known ways to protect against situations in which 
the costs of an initiative exceed the benefi ts is through careful benefi t-
cost analysis. Benefi t-cost analysis is an underutilized framework for 
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the planning and appraisal of policies and projects (Little and Mirrlees 
1996). While there is little doubt that this type of analysis is imperfect, 
if it is done properly it nevertheless makes the bases for decisions sys-
tematic and explicit. It thus forces decision makers to think clearly and 
carefully about their choices and to make the rationale for them trans-
parent and subject to wide public scrutiny and discussion. This occurs 
through prescribing a set of steps by which decision makers carefully 
consider all of the possible consequences or outcomes of a decision, 
evaluate them, and determine whether the total benefi ts promise to out-
weigh the total costs, and for whom. 
Decision makers would, for example, explicitly defi ne the objec-
tives of a proposed local economic development initiative, specify the 
alternative approaches to achieving the growth objectives, and estimate 
the costs associated with the entire range of outcomes from each of 
the alternative approaches, including all of the capital, operating, and 
intangible factors, such as dislocations, aesthetic alterations, etc. The 
benefi ts would include any improvements in the effi ciency of the urban 
economic system, as well as changes in valuation of existing facilities 
or businesses due to shifts in markets. A proposed initiative would be 
undertaken only if its benefi ts are at least as great as its costs. 
In this light it is notable that neither massive out-migration from 
cities nor the presence of too few jobs to support a population within a 
city in and of itself constitutes evidence of market failure. Rather, even 
in the presence of out-migration, markets may be working perfectly. 
People and fi rms may simply be moving to avail themselves of greater 
satisfactions, opportunities, or profi ts at other locations. People tend to 
migrate their residences to places at which, all else equal, the amenities 
are better, the quality of life is higher, or the present value of increased 
income in the new region is greater than the increased cost of living in 
that area. Similarly, fi rms may migrate out of an urban core area to avail 
themselves of greater potential profi ts attributable to changes in produc-
tion, communication, or transportation technology; relative prices of 
factor inputs; or large-scale shifts in the location of service-consuming 
populations. Observed out-migration only constitutes evidence of mar-
ket failure when it can be shown that in its absence some people would 
be better off without anyone else being made worse off, and that this is 
not happening on its own. Thus, Pfi ster (1985) labeled the use of local 
public policy to stem urban out-migration “pathological.”
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UNFATHOMABLE AND UNCERTAIN ASPECTS OF LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
Some of the decline in twentieth-century midwestern industrial 
cities has undoubtedly been attributable to macro-scale economic and 
geographical change, driven by recent advances in technologies and 
over which urban policymakers have little or no control. Insofar as 
these large-scale shifts were the primary cause of such decline, there is 
no apparent a priori reason to suppose that market failures exist. And 
insofar as no market failures exist, there is no good, theoretically sound 
reason to think that the use of economic development initiatives will in 
any signifi cant way stem further decline. Indeed, two causes of decline 
that cannot be altered through local economic development initiatives 
come immediately to mind. 
Changing Preferences Enabled by Technology
The fi rst is that technological progress has made it increasingly 
possible for people to realize their seemingly innate preferences for 
living in places with relatively mild winters and under more satisfac-
tory conditions. As noted by Andrew Thomas in Chapter 7, beginning 
shortly after air conditioning became widely accessible, the population 
of the United States has been steadily migrating from the Northeast 
and Midwest to the South and West (Rappaport 2003). These prefer-
ences, and the associated large-scale migration, have also been enabled 
by the changing composition of industry from heavy manufacturing to 
services, since service industries are freer than manufacturing to locate 
throughout the country. Also, the preferences of relatively affl uent resi-
dents to live under more satisfactory conditions, in conjunction with 
comparatively inexpensive transportation, have led them to suburbs 
and beyond, where the infrastructure and schools are in better condi-
tion, commercial corridors are available, housing stock is adequate, 
and many of the problems of the inner city can be left behind. At least 
insofar as the recent decline of twentieth-century midwestern industrial 
cities has been driven by behaviors based on innate preferences and 
enabled by technology, the use of local economic development initia-
tives is not likely to make much difference. 
up14wbrttrch10.indd   262 1/10/2014   10:15:01 AM
Misgivings about Local Economic Development Initiatives   263
Globalization
The second is globalization. Technological advancements, together 
with relaxation of legal and other institutional restrictions on interna-
tional trade, have forced fi rms in midwestern industrial cities to com-
pete today as never before with businesses in other cities around the 
country and the world (Amendola and Gaffard 1988; Antonelli 2001, 
2003; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Geroski 1995; North 1991; Scotch-
mer 2004; Searle 2005). First and foremost among these cities are 
those in China, as is described by Chieh-Chen Bowen earlier in this 
book. Among other things, newly globalized competition means that 
midwestern industrial cities are inextricably affected by inclusion in 
or exclusion from global networks of information and fi nancial control 
(Cohen 1981; Friedmann 1986; Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Neal 2011; 
Sassen 1996). The levels of wealth and prosperity within these cities 
have thus arguably become closely linked to, if not completely deter-
mined by, their positions in these networks.12 
Moreover, fi rms in these cities must vie with companies in places 
that have lower labor, energy, environmental compliance, and other 
costs of production. They must thus compete within the context of vast 
worldwide disparities in factors such as savings rates and rates of return 
on capital investments, population size, wages, levels of migration, nat-
ural endowments, regulatory environments, and investment in research, 
development and education, all of which in part determine the success 
of rivals. Firms in midwestern industrial cities are in many ways at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to similar businesses located in other 
areas around the world. To the extent that the relative decline in the 
preeminence of these cities has been attributable to globalization, the 
use of local economic development initiatives cannot be reasonably 
expected to signifi cantly ameliorate the corresponding urban problems.
It is somewhat easy to recognize and accept that historical and geo-
graphical drivers of change are of a scale that goes beyond anyone’s 
complete comprehension. But we also tend to think that, even when 
focusing only on events within local urban economic systems in the 
Midwest, complete knowledge of the effects of many local economic 
development initiatives is beyond the capacity of the human mind. This 
argument is not only intuitive but it is consistent with considerable 
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research on human psychological limitations and capacities (Kahne-
man, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Miller 1956; Simon 1974; Warfi eld 
1988). Thus, we fi nd ourselves inclined to suppose that the full range of 
the causes of some of the perceived problems in Rust Belt cities is sim-
ply unfathomable. Local economic development initiatives responding 
to these issues would, upon closer examination, be found to be attribut-
able not so much to market failure as to the interests of political and 
economic regimes, in combination with cultural and institutional tradi-
tions in which the intrinsic limitations on human knowledge are not 
recognized. A moment’s refl ection will reveal that this is not trivial. 
It implies that problems of renewing prosperity are inseparable from 
political and economic aspects of society as well as from human psy-
chological incapacities and biases that characterize virtually all other 
choices made under uncertainty. Decisions to use economic develop-
ment policies are thus tied to the possibility of human error, not to men-
tion undue political infl uence.  
The Nature and Incidence of Benefi ts
Do local economic development initiatives lead to a greater abun-
dance of resources and a fuller life for average people and whole urban 
populations, or only for a relatively small and exceptionally fortunate 
segment thereof? Given that public revenues are used to fund nonmarket 
allocation mechanisms, one might reasonably suppose that the taxpay-
ers who bear the costs would have some legitimate claim to a commen-
surate portion of the rewards. What constitutes the basis upon which 
legitimate claims to these benefi ts does and should rest? What is the 
minimally tolerable share of the gains due to any given taxpayer? These 
and similar questions seem to us to be among the most diffi cult and 
complex in any serious consideration about using these mechanisms. 
Especially when the levels of public funding for economic develop-
ment initiatives are relatively large, they will have positive effects on 
at least some segment of the local taxpaying population. But what if 
this includes primarily or only a relatively limited subset of the relevant 
taxpaying population, composed of, for instance, local landholders, real 
estate fi rms, and companies with business and other fi nancial linkages 
to the particular funding channels through which the public expendi-
tures are provided?  
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It is not always clear exactly who the benefi ciaries of local eco-
nomic development initiatives are and whether the incidence of the 
benefi ts refl ects the incidence of costs. Proponents predictably assert 
that the initiatives are conducive to the renewal of prosperity, but it is 
rarely made clear how the validity of their assertions can be determined, 
and it is rarer still that net benefi ts over costs are actually demonstrated 
in a thorough and impartial manner through an independent benefi t-
cost analysis. Seldom are clear and compelling arguments made that the 
policies will lead to a greater abundance of resources and a fuller life 
for average people within an urban system. Moreover, use of local eco-
nomic development initiatives is not always consistent with the spirit 
and principles of democratic governance, in which individual freedoms 
and rights are core values and great weight is placed on local institu-
tions that exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of 
the interests of all citizens rather than only some (Selznick 1957, 1984).
Probably the most viable way to renew prosperity in midwestern 
industrial cities is to rely as fully as possible on capitalist markets to 
make allocation decisions. This is not to say that this approach would 
always be wise or equitable. Rather it is to say that such reliance draws 
to the greatest feasible extent on the use of prices for making alloca-
tions, puts the information in the hands of the dispersed individuals 
most directly impacted by the decisions, and puts the proper incentives 
on innovators and entrepreneurs competing in markets. It also provides 
feedback about success and failure. These are all powerful systemic 
factors in renewing prosperity. Moreover, it also puts individuals in sit-
uations in which their choices to participate or not in market exchanges 
are voluntary. 
At times, uncritical use of local economic development initiatives 
has incurred huge costs in situations where no market failure has been 
demonstrated. At other times, when market failures have clearly existed, 
different approaches might have improved resource allocation in a much 
more effi cient manner. This raises the practical diffi culty of both iden-
tifying circumstances in which the use of local economic development 
initiatives will improve effi ciency and distinguishing them from those 
in which it will not. Indeed, it may raise this diffi culty beyond analytical 
tractability. Nevertheless, because resource allocations must be decided 
in some manner, and because the ways they are decided will with vir-
tual certainty affect the renewal of prosperity in these cities, there is 
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no choice but to exercise a value judgment on the matter. Accordingly, 
our preference would be for less uncritical and unevaluated reliance 
on local economic development initiatives, and more performance of 
careful benefi t-cost analysis. Our suspicion is that given such scrutiny, 
many of the policies would be very diffi cult to justify. 
In light of these considerations we would propose that prosperity 
in midwestern industrial cities would be renewed most effectively by 
establishing local rules and institutional arrangements whereby all pro-
posed new local economic development initiatives must be accompa-
nied by statements indicating their purpose, evidence that their design 
will lead to the fulfi llment of this purpose at acceptable cost, and a 
clear rationale for why such a policy should be employed. Rather than 
placing excessive reliance on local economic development initiatives 
to renew prosperity in midwestern industrial cities, we would gener-
ally favor directing public funds primarily toward effi ciently supplying 
public goods and services and protecting the rights of individuals. Local 
governments should, in our view, consider investing fewer resources 
in economic development initiatives and more in areas such as estab-
lishing appropriate levels of centralization of authority in the public 
sector, achieving an adequate degree of collective trust in public author-
ity, and defi ning and enforcing functional ownership arrangements and 
property markets. Efforts to renew prosperity in these cities should be 
directed toward creating and sustaining institutions that encourage the 
fullest possible range of initiative and responsibility on behalf of pri-
vate economic agents acting in pursuit of their own individual purposes. 
Appropriate goals include developing and implementing institutional 
arrangements that provide individuals with the greatest possible discre-
tion about how they will use their private property (and to hold them 
accountable for their choices), incentivizing the formation of competi-
tive markets, ensuring low tax rates, and setting appropriate limitations 
on the use of nonmarket allocation mechanisms.
Insofar as local governments get involved in renewing prosperity 
past this point, the guiding principle should be to establish the condi-
tions necessary for the operation of effi cient markets. These conditions 
notably include adequate schools. Markets alone will not provide for 
the lower strata of society to acquire suffi cient levels of the essential 
skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Without these competencies, 
a segment of the population in any urban economy will not be educated 
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enough to make sound political judgments as participants in local dem-
ocratic governance processes. In turn, without a suitably functioning 
democratic system, autonomy, benevolence, trust, and free exchanges 
are more likely to cease; human relations are more apt to assume the 
sort of dominance/subordination relationships that characterize serf-
dom or slavery; and overall prosperity is more likely to decrease than 
to increase.
CONCLUSION
Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that markets can fail 
and that sometimes local economic development initiatives conceived 
and implemented in the name of correcting the malfunction actually 
improve effi ciency. This poses a practical diffi culty of evaluation in 
that, while the list of market failures is long, the roster of successful 
government interventions taken to correct them is somewhat shorter. 
Moreover, while the difference between these inventories can be dis-
cussed in abstract terms, the effect of government action taken in 
response to a market failure in any given situation can only be assessed 
with empirical evidence. 
But data and evidence alone will not resolve some of the basic pub-
lic policy issues raised in this chapter. On the one hand is a popular 
and widely accepted perspective that local fi scal policy should take an 
active role in renewing prosperity, such as through efforts to reverse 
out-migration from central cities, lower unemployment rates, stabilize 
economies, and generally to intervene in markets when doing so argu-
ably leads to improved collective welfare. On the other is an Austrian 
economic perspective in which public fi scal policy cannot and should 
not as a rule intervene in the market, and the theory of the second best, 
according to which, under conditions of multiple market failure, the 
outcomes of such intervention are unpredictable. These divergent per-
spectives are not resolvable on the basis of available empirical evidence 
alone, due in large measure to the conceptual and theoretical nature of 
the differences between them. At the same time, until these disagree-
ments are satisfactorily resolved, no a posteriori ways will be available 
to answer the question: what mix of public and private activities is most 
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likely to lead to renewed prosperity in midwestern industrial cities? 
The only remaining viable option is one of trial, error, data acquisition, 
analysis, and adjustment. 
If the use of economic development initiatives is to be consistent 
with the spirit and principles of democratic governance, in which local 
institutions exercise public authority, leadership, and representation of 
the interests of all citizens rather than only some, these questions must 
be considered seriously and at length in public discourse. Decisions 
to use local economic development initiatives are thus not only about 
production and consumption, but also about ethics and values. Is the 
increment to economic output generated by a local economic devel-
opment initiative worth more to society than what it displaces? How 
greatly does the population value democratic governance? These are 
but a couple of the wide range of ethical questions indissolubly tied up 
with the use of these policies. Thus, in our view, the problems involved 
are far too important and complex to be left only to economists of any 
ilk, largely because they involve a great deal more than what is typically 
considered to be “economic.” 
Notes
 1. While Buffalo may not be a midwestern city, it is clearly a Rust Belt city and is 
thus included in the chapter.
 2. Walters (2010) argues that any satisfactory explanation of the decline of U.S. cit-
ies must start with the treatment of capital and the security of property rights 
within them, with particular emphasis on labor unions that reduce the returns to 
capital. 
 3. Considerable evidence indicates that the lion’s share of the benefi ts inure to the 
highly paid players and team owners, concession suppliers, some nearby local 
businesses, and businesses that buy season tickets as a means of increasing their 
own ticket sales. Despite gross overestimates of newly created job numbers con-
tained in promotional studies heavily funded by affected cities or teams, such 
facilities are evidently built only with substantial net economic cost to the public 
(Zimbalist 2006). 
 4. Many tax incentives are really public spending in disguise (Toder 2002, p. 66), but 
it is easier to enact ineffective or unnecessary programs in the form of tax incen-
tives than in the form of direct spending.
 5. According to the defi nition used by the Census of Governments (2002), locally 
generated general revenues are divided into three categories: 1) local taxes, 2) 
charges, and 3) miscellaneous general revenues. Local taxes contain property, 
individual income, general sales and use, motor fuel, corporate income, other 
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selected sales, vehicle license, utility, and other taxes. Current charges include 
higher education, hospital, sewerage, and other current charges. Miscellaneous 
revenues include interest and other miscellaneous revenues. All were used for this 
study. We did not include taxes on utility revenues such as electricity, water, and 
other utility revenues, and insurance trust revenues. We calculated per-capita rev-
enues by dividing locally generated total revenue in a county by that county’s 
total population. Locally generated general revenue per $1,000 of county personal 
income was calculated by dividing locally generated total revenues by total county 
personal income and multiplying that value by $1,000. The data were from the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 6. According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the 31 percent population loss in Detroit 
between 1990 and 2010 was relatively greater than the population loss in any of 
the other cities (Buffalo, 17 percent; Pittsburgh, 17 percent; St. Louis, 20 percent; 
Cleveland, 22 percent; and Cincinnati, 18 percent). To the extent that this trans-
lated into correspondingly greater losses of property values and other components 
of locally generated general revenues in Detroit vis-à-vis these other cities, this 
would contribute to, if not completely account for, the slightly negative slope in 
Detroit’s trend.  
 7. Hayek’s conception of knowledge in its practical aspect is much akin to what we 
have variously heard referred to as “know how,” “tacit knowledge,” or “traditional 
knowledge.” 
 8. The circumstances that refl ect this concern are clearly illustrated in Bolick’s 
(1993) description of the ways both liberals and conservatives miss the central 
point about individual liberties that the framers of the U.S. Constitution had in 
mind in the Bill of Rights as well as in the 9th and 14th Amendments. In providing 
this description he cites specifi c examples in which actions of local governments 
have wasted or misused tax dollars, imposed a particular set of social values on 
people who do not subscribe to those values, interfered with voluntary, nonharm-
ful economic activities, violated private property rights, and rearranged “opportu-
nities for the benefi t of some and to the detriment of others” (p. 97). 
 9. Thompson (1968) argues that urban markets are in many ways profoundly dis-
torted by widespread failure to rely suffi ciently on price signals. He primarily 
considered collectively consumed public goods, merit goods, and payments to 
redistribute income.
 10. Collective action problems occur when an individual’s contribution to the attain-
ment of a common interest is unlikely to have suffi cient impact on the advance-
ment of that interest to warrant the costs of political engagement. These problems 
tend to give way on the demand side to the capture of the governance process by 
special interests or rent seekers. On the supply side, they are associated with short-
termism and the monopoly characteristics of the political market.
 11. The logic of government failure from a decision-making point of view is spelled 
out clearly by Dörner (1996). It stems largely from unintended consequences that 
tend to occur as a result of failure or neglect on behalf of government decision 
makers to fully recognize and adequately consider the complexity involved in 
their decision situations. The general set of circumstances may be described as 
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follows. If two aspects of a given decision situation are interdependent, this means 
that they are correlated. So let us suppose aspects A and B within a given city’s 
economic system are correlated. Let us further suppose that an economic develop-
ment authority wants to alter B to change a city’s growth path. B and C are known 
to have a causal relationship, and B can be manipulated and changed at will. This 
means that by altering the level of B, the offi cial can alter the level of C, thereby 
changing the growth path. But if the decision maker is not aware of the correlation 
between A and B, in manipulating B to alter C she will also unknowingly alter A. 
The change in A is indirect, and may not be recognized until much later, if ever. 
However, the change in A is an unintended consequence of manipulating B to alter 
C. If the consequences of changing A are signifi cant in some other aspect of the 
urban economic system, and perhaps even deleterious, the actions taken to change 
the growth path in one way may unintentionally create other, new problems, some 
of which are as serious if not more serious than the original one.
 12. Neal (2011) fi nds that the direction of the causal relationship between a city’s posi-
tion in the global urban hierarchy and levels of employment goes from the position 
in the hierarchy to urban employment growth, not vice versa.
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